The current analysis introduces human capital investments which -as all other investment projects -must be carried out given ex-ante uncertain returns. This return uncertainty reflects that particular ex-post ability realizations may or may not induce the possibility to engage in profitable entrepreneurial activity. Managed firms which recruit randomly while offering a certain wage-income cannot be kept from entering the industry. However, if it is individual beneficial to seek employment in such firms, given that human capital investments are sunk, the resulting industry structure provides less incentives to invest than a purely entrepreneurial industry. While it remains true that entrepreneurial firms -if they exist -are founded by teams of superior realized abilities, the equilibrium analysis reveals a rather different perspective of the incentive mechanism. Human capital investments are not so much necessary in order to induce entrepreneurial activity. Rather, entrepreneurial activity provides the effective incentives to invest in human capital. This distinction is important to note. Due to the risk-shifting property associated with employment in managed firms, policies directed at maximizing entrepreneurial activities will generally fail to implement an efficient solution. As with every other incentive mechanism, incentive compatibility constitutes a constraint on the possibility to achieve a first-best solution.
Firm Foundations and Human Capital
Investments:
Introduction
Definitions of the "New Economy" frequently refer to particular industries -such as the bio-technology, computer, and ICT industries -in which technological innovations spark off the foundation of new firms. However, there also exists an organizational economics perspective concerning the structural similarities of such New Economy firms. This view emphasizes two common features. First, within these industries production appears to be characterized by positive externalities between specialized tasks. Second, employees are exposed to incentive schemes which induce ownership-like income claims. Thus, in corporate firms employees are typically motivated by offering stock or stock option plans.
Concerning the first characteristic feature noted above, (Rajan and Zingales 2000, 2001a) remark that the innovations themselves originate from human capital rather than inanimate firm assets. The individual member of the production team possesses necessary skills and know ledge. This argument not only implies a fundamental shift of power towards human capital. The production process is further characterized by a super-modular technology, respectively positive complementarities among team members assigned to specialized tasks. It can be shown that flat hierarchies dominate in the organization of such processes 1 . Moreover, following (Prat
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The O-Ring Approach to Organizational Equilibrium in an Emerging Industry 3 ports that New Economy firm founders are in fact characterized by superior educational backgrounds. However, the existence of such an equilibrium requires that the ability spread within the group of industry professionals must be sufficiently large. The benefits of self-selecting by founding a new firm must more than compensate the risk-premium. Clearly, the realized ability spread depends on ex-ante individual human capital investments. At the same time, the incentives to invest in human capital just as obviously depend on the industry's ex-post organizational structure. More precisely, the strength of these incentives reflect the degree of entrepreneurial activity in the industry. Only existing options to found new firms can yield a benefit of selfselection.
Hence, the current analysis introduces human capital investments which -as all other investment projects -must be carried out given ex-ante uncertain returns. The return risk reflects that particular ex-post ability realizations may or may not induce the possibility to engage in profitable entrepreneurial activity. Managed firms which recruit randomly while offering a certain wage-income cannot be kept from entering the industry. However, if it is individually beneficial to seek employment in such firms, given that human capital investments are sunk, the resulting industry structure provides less incentives to invest than a purely entrepreneurial industry.
While it remains true that entrepreneurial firms -if they exist -are founded by teams of realized superior abilities, the equilibrium analysis reveals a rather different perspective of the incentive mechanism. Human capital investments are not so much necessary in order to induce entrepreneurial activity. Rather, entrepreneurial activity provides the effective incentives to invest in human capital. This distinction is important to note. Due to the risk-shifting associated with employment in managed firms, policies directed at maximizing entrepreneurial activities will generally fail to implement an efficient solution. As with every other incentive mechanism, incentive compatibility constitutes a constraint on the possibility to achieve a first-best solution.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the basic assumptions and notations. Section 3 then investigates the incentives to invest in human capital, given that the industry consists of managed, respectively entrepreneurial firms only. The following section 4 investigates the ex-ante investment i ncentives which endogenously arise given the induced ex-post industry equilibrium. Since all propositions de-rived in section 4 are interpreted in detail, the final section 5 then only provides a brief concluding discussion.
Basic assumptions
Suppose that 2 K K, ≥ , separate tasks must be performed simultaneously in order to produce output. The output good becomes more sophisticated and, thus, more valuable for consumers as the number of tasks defined in the production process increases. Per-capita revenue is therefore given by r(K), with r(K) > 0, for K > 0, and r'(K) > 0. Yet, in contrast to (Fabel 2002) , the number of tasks is exogenous throughout the current analysis. It reflects the state of the art in production in a newly emerging industry. Thus, for notational simplicity r ) k ( r ≡ in the following.
Further, following (Kremer 1993) , positive output can only be realized if all K production tasks are performed perfectly. If a single member of the production team fails in performing the task assigned to her, the output of the whole group is destroyed. This so-called O-Ring theory of production implies that team production is characterized by positive complementarities 11 .
Assuming that each task is carried out by exactly one team member, let i q then denote the probability of perfect task performance of team mem-
. Given the assumption above, total revenue thus equals 
On the other hand, if individuals of identical qualities can be matched within firms, the average expected revenue over all such firms equals ( )
Hence, taking the ex-ante perspective, all individuals who have not yet realized this productive quality would strictly prefer to enter an economy in which production teams are quality-matched. Moreover,
. Thus, the productive advantages of matching teams of identical quality imply economy-wide increasing returns to human capital investments.
is sufficient to induce the first-best investment level 1 ã = , due to the increasing returns implied by (4) and (5).
However, implementing the first-best solution requires a transfer scheme which provides a certain income equal to the average expected per-capita revenue for all individuals. The project risk would have to be distributed over the whole population. Yet, in this case all individuals would obviously prefer
Hence, the income opportunities of a competitive economy must provide sufficient incentives to induce human capital investments. In the following, it is therefore assumed that individuals may found partnerships. Since every partner is a member of the production team herself, she can also verify each other team member's productive quality. Furthermore, partnerships can enforce individual attachments or separations respectively. Thus, partnerships can form matched production teams.
At the same time, they can only distribute realized revenue among their partners. Due to the quality risk associated with each team member, partnership income is thus always subject to project risk. Partnerships will therefore be denoted entrepreneurial firms in the following. Clearly, if there exist such firms in industry equilibrium, the first-best will not be implemented. Partnerships preclude risk-sharing.
Since the production technology is common knowledge, the already existing Old Economy may also integrate part of the industry. Within these firms managers are responsible for employee selection. Since the managers do not participate in the production process themselves, they cannot verify individual qualities. Alternatively, it can be assumed that the corporate culture of these firms precludes the necessary wage-differentiation. Such managed firms therefore hire randomly from the pool of potential emplo yees in the industry. However, they will also pay a certain salary w m . Thus, employees of managed firms do not face income risk, but their firms are subject to quality risk. 
Firm types and human capital investments
Clearly, all firms are subject to the project risk associated with their employees', respectively their partners' failure in task performance. Realizing zero profit therefore does not signal a lack of productive quality. Moreover, if managed firms conditioned their salary on project success, individuals would always prefer to join a partnership. This follows from the fact that managed firms cannot observe individual qualities and, thus, do not implement quality-matched teams. Hence, the only way to successfully compete with partnerships is to offer risk-free salaries when contracting with employees. The expected profit of a managed firm can be derived as The firm's expectation concerning the ability profile of its employees must be entirely based on anticipating the equilibr ium human capital investments. It is assumed that the non-cooperative Nash-equilibrium concept applies. Recalling that all individuals are ex-ante identical, the equi-
Hence, 
Again, managed firms cannot observe the quality realizations of their employees.
Clearly, offering a fixed income w m when recruiting employees, managed firms cannot avoid to incur losses of size -w m K, with probability
. Competition among these firms implies zero expected profits. Thus, the salary level equals
Note once more that this salary level only depends on the equilibrium investment level ã . However, each employee actually possesses a fixed income claim. Thus, the individuals choose their investment level and production in the new industry does not take place.
Q.E.D.
Obviously, individual incomes must internalize at least part of the project risk in order to provide incentives for human capital investments. Given the distinction of only two firm types above, this requires the existence of some e ntrepreneurial firms in the industry. Thus, let
denote the ability profile of partnership p, p = 1, …, P. The expected utility from participating in this partnership can then be derived as
for each partner j, j=1,…,K. Without loss of generality, (10) assumes that total revenue K r is distributed equally across partners. Then, note that
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Thus, joining partnerships which already consist of relatively high quality team members will always be more attractive than entering partnerships characterized by a relatively poor quality profile
At the same time, existing partnerships will compete for the highest quality team member available in the industry's pool of potential partners. These arguments imply that, in equilibrium, all partnerships consist of team members of identical quality. Hence,
Entrepreneurial firms p, p = 1, …, P, differ with respect to team quality, while exhibiting a homogeneous ability profile.
Given that entrepreneurial firms always exploit the benefits of abilitymatching, let 0 ã ≥ again denote an equilibrium human capital investment level. Consider an organizational equilibrium in the industry consisting of entrepreneurial firms only. The size of the population is taken to be sufficiently large. Thus, the individual probability to realize quality , in which case she cannot team up with partners of identical quality. Then recall (11)-(12). The expected utility of all (K -1) partners increases when a superior-ability partner is attracted. Hence, all existing partnerships will accept individual j. She can therefore freely choose which firm to join. Obviously, she will join a partnership which offers the highest expected utility of all.
Hence, given her believe
and k j ≠ , individual j's ex-ante expected utility can be obtained as: 
Since all entrepreneurial firms implement perfect quality-matching, a single individual's choice of human capital investment affects the probability to be able to join a team of a particular quality. Hence, participating in an entrepreneurial firm provides incentives to invest in human capital. If individual j should choose 0 a j = , the probability of earning r by joining an entrepreneurial firm equals zero with certainty.
The following can then be shown: (19) is satisfied (sufficient condition). Since this applies to every individual, given that she anticipates that all others choose this investment level, 1 ã = constitutes a Nash-equilibrium. Noting that, for c y > , the RHS of (19) is monotonically increasing in r yields the qualif ication reported in the proposition.
The second possible Nash-equilibrium is more easily i dentified. If 
, with j k ≠ , cannot exist.
Q.E.D.
If individual j believes that all others will not i nvest in human capital, she anticipates that all projects will be unsuccessful with certainty. Hence, she will not invest herself either. In contrast, if she believes that everyone else chooses the efficient investment level, this choice will also constitute her individual optimum. However, two conditions must then further be satisfied. First, she must be able to finance her own education. Second, the activity must be sufficiently productive such that per-capita revenue compensates for the cost of education and the risk-premium. Hence, while such an organizational equilibrium provides sufficient incentives to induce the efficient human capital investment level, it clearly does not implement the first-best.
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Endogenous organizational equilibrium and human capital investments
Effective incentives for human capital investments can only stem from entrepreneurial activity. However, propositions 1 and 2 assume the existence of either one of the two possible pure organizational equilibria. As for mixed industry equilibria in which both firm types coexist, the following holds: 
Q q ∈ ∀
Again, according to (20), the expected partnership utility monotonically increases in team quality q . Hence, the inequalities (21) cannot hold simultaneously. The proposition thus follows by contradiction.
Q.E.D.
If some ability-matched groups ever found partnerships, all individuals characterized by higher qualities will also prefer this option over joining a managed firm. Every mixed organizational equilibrium which can prevail in the new industry is therefore characterized by a single quality level q which separates managed firm employment from entrepreneurial activity.
Given this characterization, the Nash-equilibr ium consequences for human capital investments must be addressed. As in Propositions 1 and 2, the behavioral effects can be obtained by maximizing the respective expected utility: 
vidual j will join a managed firm with certainty. Only if q a j > , the option of teaming up with partners of identical quality> to found an entrepreneurial firm arises. Then, if the individual's optimal choice entails q a * j ≤ , symmetry implies that 0 ã = must constitute the unique Nashequilibrium. Thus, whether or not this case applies hinges on the incentives to found partnerships. Since these incentives depend on equilibrium i nvestment level ã again, it is useful to note the following:
Proposition 4: Suppose the industry structure constitutes a mixed equilibrium. Hence, q , with 1 q 0 < < , separates intervals of realized qualities such that individuals characterized by≤ (> ) prefer to be employed by managed firms (to found entrepreneurial firms). Then, the exante equilibrium human capital investment level must satisfy 1 ã = .
Proof: The first-order condition for interior optimal with respect to j a can be derived as (24) and (25) again distinguish the consequences
constitutes a Nash-equilibrium human capital investment level, both conditions must hold for ã a j = . Insertion in (24) and (25) can then be seen to yield
Clearly, (26) not only contradicts that ã , with 1 ã q 0 < < < , may constitute a Nash-equilibrium. Since (25) reflects the change in expected utility as the individual increases her investment level j a , the pos itive sign in (26) also implies that 1 ã a j = = constitutes the only possible equilibrium choice in this case.
If both firm types coexist in equilibrium, the individuals will always enter managed firms with positive probability. In this case they cannot benefit from the productive advantage of ability-matched teams. Hence, deriving the second-order conditions associated with (24) and (25) respectively,
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cannot be excluded a priori. However, (22) highlights a second, unambiguously positive effect of increasing the individual investment level j a above the level ã which she believes to be chosen by all others. She can increase the probability of joining a partnership characterized by the highest realized quality level in the industry.
While this effect also occurs in (15) and (17), it is not necessary to prove Proposition 2. In contrast, it turns out to be decisive in generating the pos itive sign in (26). The possibility to join an entrepreneurial firm with a top-ability team more than compensates for the reduction in investment incentives due to the coexistence of managed firms.
Proposition 4 then allows to compute the equilibrium expected utility, given a particular industry structure. It follows:
≥ , there always exists an organizational equilibrium with efficient human capital investments 1 ã = . Hence, the new industry will emerge as long as individual j , Proof: Consider the difference between the expected utility d erived from a marginal partnership combining K individuals of identical ability q and the certain utility associated with joining a managed firm which randomly recruits among individuals characte rized by , the difference in first derivatives must be accounted for: yields an equilibrium in which the ex-ante expected utility is weakly higher compared to the situation with no production in the new industry. In the latter case, everyone consumes 0 y > . The ex-ante expected utility is even strictly higher, if there exist some entrepreneurial firms. While (6) above therefore remains necessary for the emergence of the new industry, the inequality reported in part (a) of Proposition 5 constitutes a sufficient condition.
If it is satisfied there exists an equilibrium with at least some entrepreneurial firms. Above, this equilibrium has been shown to be locally stable with respect to the ex-ante individually optimal choices of human capital investments. Also, it globally dominates the solution 0 ã = which necessarily emerges, if there exist only managed firms in the industry.
Q.E.D.
Conditions (i) and (ii) in Proposition 5(b) reflect the strength of the incentives to found entrepreneurial firms in industry equilibrium. Thus, ) c y /( r − measures the benefit-loss ratio associated with organizing the firm as a partnership. If this ratio is reduced, the adverse effect of project risk on expected partnership utility ceteris paribus decreases.
On the other hand, for large ratios ) c y /( r − , risk-averse individuals will always prefer to possess the option of receiving a certain utility in managed firms. Their risk-premium associated with being exposed to pr oject risk as members of entrepreneurial firms exceeds the expected income loss which -due to random recruiting -has to be incurred when joining a managed firm. The strength of this incentive to found partnerships as well as the possibility to realize an equilibrium outcome with efficient human capital i nvestments both depend on the size of the per-capita revenue r . Thus, very large r -values induce two effects which on first sight appear contradictory.
First, the emergence of the new industry becomes more likely and, given that production then actually becomes profitable, an equilibrium with managed firms only cannot exist. Second, ceteris paribus relatively large per-capita revenue associated with successful production also induce a tendency towards profitable market-entrance of ma naged firms.
Hence, while entrepreneurial firms are necessary to provide human capital investment incentives, highly productive new industries will also be particularly attractive for managed firms. Their market entrance reduces the incentives to invest in human capital again. The mere presence of managed firms thus decreases the likelihood that the new industry will actually emerge.
Comparing condition (6) with part (a) of Proposition 5, the emergence of the new industry requires per-capita revenue
Hence, focussing exclusively on the potential productive benefits of a new industry -in particular, assuming a first-best solution could be implemented -generally underestimates the actual chances to experience the emergence of such an industry.
Furthermore, part (a) of Proposition 5 additionally requires that all individuals actually believe that everyone else will invest efficiently in human capital. As shown in Proposition 2, there always exists a stable equilibrium characterized by investments 0
, as well. If regulating and subsidizing formal education would implement a lower bound for realized productive qualities, this outcome could generally be avoided.
Hence, an educational policy which ensures that every individual in the economy is characterized by a strictly positive probability of perfect task performance will enhance the likelihood of new industry emergence. Yet, given the incentives for managed firms' market entrance, ensuring minimum educational standards alone cannot guarantee the emergence of a new industry.
Since this result holds even if commencing production in this new industry is efficient, additional governmental aid such as tax-benefits, or subsidized venture capital for e ntrepreneurial firms can be welfareenhancing. However, as shown below, the success of such subsidies can not be measured in terms of maximizing entrepreneurial activity.
Case ( Each of these intersections -characterized by a separating ability level s q , s = 1, …, S -constitutes a mixed equilibrium. Since both the expected utility derived from participating in a partnership and the certain utility associated with managed firm emplo yment are monotonically increasing in q, the equilibrium characterized by } q max{ q s * = then dominates. These arguments imply part (a) of Proposition 6. Part (a) of Proposition 6 demonstrates the danger of misperception of the equilibrium mechanism by policy-makers. On the one hand, without entrepreneurial activity there exist no incentives to invest in human capital. On the other hand, maximizing the entrepreneurial activity in an industry does not yield an efficient solution.
In general, there will exist multiple mixed organizational equilibria . The equilibrium characterized by the highest separating ability level dominates.
